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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is perhaps nothing so uniquely identified with the practice of law, cer-
tainly nothing so central to the lawyer’s daily life, as the billable hour. While the 
                                                          
 
 
 * The title is a play on the phrase “drill, baby, drill,” which gained prominence during the 
2008 U.S. Presidential Campaign. The phrase was utilized by the McCain-Palin ticket to call for increased 
domestic production of oil. The former Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Michael Steele, 
has been cited as one of the first people to use the “drill, baby, drill” phrase, during his speech at the 2008 
Republican National Convention. Siobhan Hughes, Steele Gives GOP Delegates New Cheer: ‘Drill, Baby, 
Drill!’, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2008, 10:50 PM, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2008/09/03/steele-gives-gop-
delegates-new-cheer-drill-baby-drill/. The “drill, baby, drill” phrase is itself a likely play on the phrase 
“burn, baby, burn” which became synonymous with the 1965 Watts riots. See JERRY COHEN & WILLIAM S. 
MURPHY, BURN, BABY, BURN! THE LOS ANGELES RACE RIOT AUGUST, 1965, 63 (1966). 
 **  Assistant Professor of Business Law, College of Business and Economics, California State 
University, Northridge; email: stuart.pardau@csun.edu. (J.D. Stanford Law School, 1992). The author 
would like to thank Blake McKay Edwards (Pepperdine, J.D. 2011) who provided comments and edits to 
this article. 
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rest of the world’s professionals divide their respective days by mornings, lunches, 
and afternoons; by a schedule of hour-long appointments; or by the opening and 
closing bell of a stock exchange, the lawyer’s day is often sliced paper thin, and 
sometimes in maddeningly complex ways. Does he bill for a five-minute phone 
call? Does she double bill for work done for one client while traveling on behalf of 
another? If he’s working on a memo, does he stop the clock for a trip to the bath-
room? These are the types of difficult, and sometimes strange, questions that law-
yers ask. And the average lawyer asks them a lot in a year’s time; if attorneys are 
known for the billable hour, they are also known for the staggering numbers of 
them they log, especially at large law firms. 
As economic and competitive pressures on attorneys and on their clients have 
increased in recent years, both law firms and their governing jurisdictions have 
begun looking for ways to adapt to a changing world. Not surprisingly, the billable 
hour is at the center of the discussion. This article aims to explain how the billable 
hour came to occupy this place of prominence and to address whether its demise is 
as imminent as some have suggested. Part II discusses the origins of the billable 
hour. Part III reviews the billable hour’s eventual adoption as the standard method 
of billing, the subsequent abuses that ensued, and attempts to address these contin-
ued abuses. Part IV discusses recent developments in the legal market, including 
job losses, increased global competition, and deregulation, and their impact on the 
billable hour. Part V discusses the Alternative Fee Arrangement (AFA) and some 
of its shortcomings as a substitute for the billable hour. Part VI concludes. 
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE BILLABLE HOUR 
Traditionally, legal services were sold at fixed fees that reflected relatively 
routinized and simple tasks.
1
 As Thomas Morgan explains it: 
[The] drafting [of] a will might involve adapting a form to incorporate the 
client’s information, and the client would be charged $100. An uncompli-
cated adoption would take a little longer because a court visit would be in-
volved, but the time could be predicted and the job might be priced at 
$500. Defense of a drunk driving charge might require more experience 
and courtroom time, but lawyers could set a fee of $1,000 that clients 
would gladly pay to reduce the chance of serving time in jail.
2
 
Historically, these “going rates” were codified by state laws, which regulated 
what legal fees could be paid, taking into account lawyers’ supplements to income, 
such as annual retainers or discretionary bonuses paid by satisfied clients.
3
 By the 
early twentieth century, several different types of billing methods were utilized, 
including set fees for a particular task, annual retainers, discretionary “eyeball” 
methods, and contingency fees, which was approved by the ABA in 1908.
4
 In the 
                                                          
 1. THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 102 (2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Niki Kuckes, The Short, Unhappy History of How Lawyers Bill Their Clients, LEGAL 
AFFAIRS (Sept.–Oct. 2002), http://legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-
2002/review_kuckes_sepoct2002.msp. 
 4. Id. However, it was not until 1965 that Maine, which up to that point banned contingency 
fees as champerty, eliminated the prohibition. Bernardo M. Cremades, Jr., Third Party Litigation Funding: 
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early 1930s and 1940s, state bar associations, wanting to increase attorney incomes, 
began publishing “suggested” minimum fee schedules that set standard pricing for 
a variety of legal services, such as drafting a will or handling a contested divorce.
5
 
While these minimum fee schedules were supposedly voluntary, if a bar member 
undercut these minimum prices, it could give rise to disciplinary action by a state 
bar.
6
 Indeed, the ABA model rules, then in effect through 1969, advised that it was 
“‘unethical’ for an attorney to ‘undervalue’ his legal services.”
7
 After the Supreme 
Court’s 1975 decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State, which held minimum fees 
schedules violated antitrust law, the billable hour method (which was already grow-
ing in popularity) became the predominant method of compensation.
8
 
However, while the Supreme Court’s ruling in Goldfarb set the stage for the 
predominance of the billable hour as the primary mechanism for attorney fee gen-
eration in the United States, the notion that there was a direct correlation between 
the hours worked by the lawyer and the services she produced (and therefore the 
fees she generated) had already been long established. In an often-quoted phrase, 
Abraham Lincoln was purported to have said: “A lawyer’s time and advice are his 
stock in trade.”
9
 Indeed, with the rise of industrialization and the development of 
the notion of “time management,” the first widespread adoption of the close track-
ing of time spent on a project is attributable to Reginald Heber Smith, a Harvard 
graduate and attorney hired to head The Boston Legal Aid Society in 1913.
10
 It is 




Additionally, the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—adopted in 1938
12
 
with substantial new pretrial discovery requirements (including the development of 
the “motion” practice)—significantly increased the complexity and unpredictability 
of litigation.
13
 This made it far more difficult for lawyers to estimate their work-
loads and set a reasonable, agreed-upon flat fee in advance with the client.
14
 Con-
temporaneous with these changes to the Federal Rules, the New Deal was growing 
both the size and the scope of the federal government, increasing the complexity of 
regulatory compliance for businesses (frequently an unpredictable process and not 
                                                                                                                                       
Investing in Arbitration, 8 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 3–5 (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.curtis.com/siteFiles/Publications/TDM.pdf.  
 5. Kuckes, supra note 3. 
 6. Id. 
  7. Id. 
 8. See generally Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788–92 (1975).  
 9. See MORGAN, supra note 1, at 102. 
 10. Smith was enamored with, and inspired by, concepts like scientific management, which was 
designed to make factories become more productive. See Slice of History: Reginald Heber Smith and the 
Birth of the Billable Hour, WILMERHALE (Aug. 9, 2010), 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=95929. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Similar changes were subsequently also adopted and incorporated into the various state rules 
of civil procedure. See Kuckes, supra note 3. 
 13. Kuckes, supra note 3.  
 14. Kuckes, supra note 3. 
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amenable to fixed fee arrangements or “cookie-cutter” solutions).
15
 Adoption of the 
billable hour method was also pushed by clients who perceived uncertainty about 
the time and effort required by the lawyer to resolve complex matters, and who 
were starting to believe that the time it took to resolve a matter successfully was the 
most reasonable measure of value for an attorney’s services.
16
 The billable hour 
method also enabled the client to monitor the time spent by a lawyer on each of the 
tasks more effectively and transparently, to have detailed data on how the law firm 
was staffing cases, and on the law firm’s efficiency in general.
17
 
Another key driver towards timekeeping and the billable hour was, simply 
put, the desire for lawyers to earn more money. One widely cited ABA study, “The 
1958 Lawyer and His 1938 Dollar,” lamented the fact that lawyers’ incomes had 
not kept up with those of other professionals, notably physicians.
18
 The ABA ad-
monished lawyers that, without compromising their professional standards, they 
could “learn much from our business brother,”
19
 specifically by keeping better rec-
ords of their time in order to justify and therefore realize more revenue from their 
clients.
20
 The ABA recommended that lawyers bill 1,300 hours per year, unless the 
lawyer worked “overtime,”
21
 an annual target which translated to five to six hours 
of billable time per day, assuming a five or five and one-half day work week.
22
 
While the ABA recognized that not all lawyers could obtain the hourly rates re-
quired by their target incomes,
23
 those that could not were advised to simply obtain 
additional business and bill more hours to make their goals.
24
 The ABA’s 1958 
targets seem low, even quaint, by today’s standards, but the underlying methodolo-
gy and animating mentality remain familiar to every attorney today. 
III. THE CONTINUED RISE OF THE BILLABLE HOUR 
A. The Massive Growth of Big Law Firms Leads to the Central Role of the Billable 
Hour 
Lawyers’ incomes grew steadily in the 1960s and the 1970s, but really took 
off in the 1980s, when it became commonplace for law firms to require attorneys to 
bill 1,750 to 1,800 hours per year.
25
 The founding of legal publications, such as the 
                                                          
 15. Kuckes, supra note 3.  
 16. See MORGAN, supra note 1, at 104. 
 17. Id. See also Steven J. Harper, Why the Billable Hour Endures, THE BELLY OF THE BEAST 
(April 24, 2013), http://thelawyerbubble.com/2013/04/24/why-the-billable-hour-endures/ (“The billable 
hour regime endures because, like the general counsel of Veolia, clients think they have it under control. 
But that requires a leap of faith as outside lawyers resolve the ongoing dilemma of a system that pits fiduci-
ary responsibility to a client against the attorneys’ financial self-interest.”) [hereinafter Harper, Billable 
Hour Endures]. 
 18. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON ECON. OF LAW PRACTICE, THE 1958 LAWYER AND HIS 1938 
DOLLAR 5 (1958). 
 19. Id. at 6. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 10. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Lawyers were urged to set a target income for themselves, and then divide that number by 
1,300 to set their hourly rate. Id. 
 24. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON ECON. OF LAW PRACTICE, supra note 18, at 10. 
 25. See Scott Turow, The Billable Hour Must Die, ABA J. MAG., (Aug. 1, 2007, 2:54 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_billable_hour_must_die/. 
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American Lawyer by Steven Brill in 1979, brought greater transparency to the legal 
profession and to law firm profits in particular.
26
 New measures like the “Profits 
Per Partner” (PPP) metric encouraged firms to increase both billable hour require-
ments and hourly rates in order to keep pace with competitors’ profits.
27
 Thus, it 
was no big “news” in 2002 when the ABA, in its Commission on Billable Hours 
Report, proposed a total expectation of 2,300 hours of billable and non-billable 
time per attorney, 1,900 of which should be billable client work.
28
 According to the 
most recent figures available from the National Association of Law Placement 
(NALP), which aggregates self-reported information by law firms with more than 
seven hundred attorneys, the average billable hour requirement remains a stagger-
ing 2,208 hours per year.
29
 
However astounding these statistics may have become, they actually under-
state the total hours dedicated by the attorney to his or her job.
30
 According to the 
Yale Law School, when an attorney takes into account such considerations as 
commuting, lunches, continuing legal education requirements, and administrative 
responsibilities at the firm, a 1,832 billable hours requirement actually entails 2,420 
hours of work.
31
 Based on that ratio, an attorney who bills 2,201 hours works 3,058 
hours.
32
 As former Kirkland & Ellis LLP partner Stephen Steven J. Harper com-
mented, “[b]illing 2,000 hours a year isn’t easy. It typically takes fifty hours a week 
to bill an honest forty hours to a client. Add commuting time, bathroom breaks, 
lunch, holidays, an annual vacation and a little socializing, and most associates find 
themselves working evenings and weekends to ‘make their hours.’”
33
 In the wry 
words of another observer, these work hours “equat[e] to the amount of time work-
ers in industrialized countries worked in 1870”—an era characterized by sweat-
shops that gave rise to the American labor movement.”
34
 
Under the billable-hour system, a law firm is able to generate additional prof-
its by increasing the hourly rates that are charged to clients, increasing the billable 
                                                          
 26. See Noam Scheiber, The Last Days of Big Law: You Can’t Imagine the Terror when the 
Money Dries Up, NEW REPUBLIC (July 21, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/ 113941/big-law-
firms-trouble-when-money-dries#. 
 27. Id.  
 28. ABA Comm. on Billable Hours, ABA Commission on Billable Hours Report, 2001–2002, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 1, 49–51 (2002), 
http://ilta.ebiz.uapps.net/productfiles/productfiles/914311/FMPG4_ABABillableHours2002.pdf. 
 29. Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Number of Associate Hours Worked Increases at Largest 
Firms, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT (Feb. 2012), http://www.nalp.org/billable_hours_feb2012. 
 30. The Truth about the Billable Hour, YALE LAW SCHOOL, 
http://www.law.yale.edu/studentlife/cdobrochureshandouts_truthaboutthebillablehour.htm (last visited Nov. 
15, 201 ) . 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Steven J. Harper, The Tyranny of the Billable Hour, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/opinion/the-case-against-the-law-firm-billable-hour.html.  
 34. Theresa M. Beiner, Sleeping and Dreaming: How Law Firms Undermine Diversity and In-
crease Client Costs through High Billable Hour Requirements 25 (Aug. 17, 2011) (unpublished manu-
script), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=theresa_beiner (citing Gerhard 
Bosch & Steffen Lehndorff, Working-Time Reduction and Employment: Experiences in Europe and Eco-
nomic Policy Recommendations, 25 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 209, 214 (2001)). 
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hours of the attorney, leveraging other attorneys and staff who are billed out at rates 
above the firm’s allocable fixed and variable costs, or a combination of these meth-
ods.
35
 Hourly rates, while subject to periodic or even regular increases, are limited 
by what clients are ultimately willing to pay.
36
 Criticisms of the billable hour, and 
even predictions of its demise, have become de rigueur.
37
 The billable hour has 
routinely been criticized, including by the ABA itself,
38
 as creating incentives for 
lawyers to be inefficient, pitting the lawyer’s financial interest against that of the 
client.
39
 Even more egregious are the possible incentives to inflate or “pad” hours 
by billing for work in excess of what was actually done.
40
 
B. Abuses of the Billable Hour 
These extreme billable hour requirements have led to some bizarre and noto-
rious examples of obscenely exaggerated, even fabricated, billing, which support a 
growing body of empirical evidence that deceptive billing practices by lawyers are 
common occurrences.
41
 To wit, there was the lawyer from Norwich, Connecticut, 
who billed ninety-four hours in a single day; the lawyer from Raleigh, North Caro-
lina, who billed 13,000 hours for a thirteen-month period; and the lawyer from Bal-
timore, Maryland, who, with the approval of his firm’s finance committee, had the 
law firm’s computer network automatically increase all time billed to a particular 
client by fifteen percent.
42
 DLA Piper, ranked in 2012 as the largest law firm in the 
world,
43
 is now in the midst of a major fee dispute with a former client who is seek-
ing over $22 million in punitive damages over allegations of an intentional and 
“sweeping practice of overbilling.”
44
 Included in the evidence are highly incrimi-
                                                          
 35. See Michael Roster, Time to Blow Up the Billable Hour Formula, ABA LEGAL REBELS 
BLOG (Nov. 28, 2012, 10:10 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/time_to_blow_up_the_formula. 
 36. See Robert Pack, The Tyranny of the Billable Hour, WASHINGTON LAWYER (January 2005), 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/washington_lawyer/january_2005/billable.cfm. 
 37. See generally id.; Jonathan D. Glater, Billable Hours Giving Ground at Law Firms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/business/30hours.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; 
Turow, supra note 25. 
 38. See ABA COMM. ON BILLABLE HOURS, supra note 28. 
 39. Id. at 7, 15. 
 40. Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems and Pres-
sure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 178 (2005). One of the survey respondents who was an associate 
at a larger firm stated, “The 2000 billable hour requirement is an impossible task for an HONEST hard-
working attorney. I am here every day at least 12 hours and NEVER take a lunch. But not everything is 
billable. I made my hours last year but did so only because I did not take a vacation. I HATE being an 
attorney! I have no life. I know that my colleagues regularly falsely elevate their time entries. They have to 
because they all take lunches every day and leave at 5 or 6 every night.” Id.  
 41. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 503 (5th ed.  2010). 
As Professor Hazard points out, these practices implicate numerous ethics rules in addition to ABA Model 
Rule 1.5(a), including Model Rule 8.4(c) (a lawyer must not engage in “fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”) 
and Model Rule 7.1 (a lawyer must not make “false and misleading communications” about legal services). 
Id. 
 42. Michael Downey, Ethics and Time-Based Billing, L. PRAC. TODAY (Jan. 2006), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/mgt01064.html. 
 43. The distinction was based on number of attorneys. Law360 ranks DLA Piper first in firm 
size, DLA PIPER (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.dlapiper.com/law360-news/. 
 44. Peter Lattman, Suit Offers a Peek at the Practice of Inflating a Legal Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 25, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/suit-offers-a-peek-at-the-practice-of-padding-a-
legal-bill/?_r=0. 
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nating internal emails, which include such inflammatory statements by DLA Piper 
partners as “[we have our lawyers] working full time on random research projects 
in standard ‘churn that bill, baby!’ mode. That bill shall know no limits.”
45
 DLA 
Piper is not the first renowned law firm to be involved in a major billing controver-
sy.
46
 At Chapman & Cutler LLP, a respected Chicago firm, a partner billed 6,000 
hours in one year, which comes to a jaw-dropping 16.5 hours for each of the 365 
days in the calendar year.
47
 Neither have esteemed individuals been immune from 
temptation.
48
 Webster Hubbell, a former Arkansas Supreme Court Justice
49
 and 
Associate Attorney General in the Clinton Administration, was convicted of and 
ultimately went to prison for fraudulently billing clients for time he never worked 
while a partner at the Rose Law Firm in Little Rock.
50
 
C. Attempts to Address Billable Hour Abuses: ABA Formal Opinion 93-379 
Attempts to address abuses that arise out of the billable hour system go back 
to at least the early 1990s, when the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 93-379, Billing for Professional 
Fees, Disbursements and Other Expenses.
51
 This opinion addressed several billing-
related issues, including the inappropriateness of charging or passing through vari-
ous overhead expenses—generally associated with properly maintaining a staff and 
equipping an office—or adding handling fees or mark-ups in connection with ser-
vices provided by third parties,
52
 such as court reporters, travel agents, or expert 
witnesses.
53
 The authors of Formal Opinion 93- 79 noted that “[I]t is a common 
perception that pressure on lawyers to bill a minimum number of hours and on law 




One scenario addressed by the ABA in Formal Opinion 93-379 involves an 
attorney who bills more than one client for the same hours spent.
55
 Such a situation 
can arise when, for example, an attorney is flying cross-country to attend a deposi-
                                                          
 45. Id. 
 46. See Veronica Anderson, Damage Control Shifts Into High Gear at Chapman A Quiet Law 
Firm in Spotlight of Legal Scandal, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUS., May 30, 1994, 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/19940528/ISSUE01/100012025/damage-control-shifts-to-high-
gear-at-chapman-a-quiet-firm-in-spotlight-of-legal-scandal. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Bob Franken, Hubbell pleads guilty as part of deal with Starr, CNN (June 30, 1999), 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/06/30/hubbell/. 
 49. Al Kamen, CATCHING UP WITH . . . Webb Hubbell, WASHINGTON POST, June 25, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/post/catching-up-with----webb-
hubbell/2012/06/25/gJQAfpf51V_blog.html. 
 50. See Franken supra, note 48. 
 51. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 9 -379, (1993). 
 52. Id. at 1. This prohibition does not apply where the lawyer “incurs costs additional to the di-
rect cost of the third-party services.” Id. 
 53. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 51, at 1. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 3–6. 
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tion on behalf of one client, and during the flight works on a draft of a motion on 
behalf of another client.
56
 Can the attorney bill time for both the travel time and the 
work on the plane, and effectively “double bill”?
57
 Categorically, the ABA opined 
in the negative,
58
 arguing that such a practice would constitute an unreasonable 
billing practice in violation of Section 1.5 of the ABA Rules of Professional Con-
duct
59
 and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-106.
60
 Specifical-
ly, 1.5(a)(1) makes reference to the reasonableness of the “time and labor” re-
quired.
61
 Citing the Comment to Section 1.5, Formal Opinion 93-379 states that 
“[a] lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges 
by using wasteful procedures;”
 62
 in other words, the “goal” should be “solely to 
compensate the lawyer fully for time reasonably expended, an approach that if fol-
lowed will not take advantage of the client.”
63
 In this context, the operative phrases 
or concepts utilized by the ABA are: lawyer efforts “expended” and fees “earned.” 
As the authors of Formal Opinion 93-379 plainly stated: 
A lawyer, who flies [on an airplane] for six hours for one client, while 
working for five hours on behalf of another, has not earned eleven billable 
hours . . . Rather than looking to profit from . . . the desire to get work 
done rather than watch a movie, . . . the lawyer who has agreed to bill 
solely on the basis of time spent is obliged to pass the benefits of these 
economies on to the client. The practice of billing several clients for the 
same time or work product, since it results in the earning of an unreasona-
ble fee, therefore is contrary to the mandate of . . . [Model Rule 1.5].
64
 
                                                          
 56. Id. at 4. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (1983). Rule 1.5 states: 
(a) A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the rea-
sonableness of a fee include the following: 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, 
and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular em-
ployment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 
services; and  
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent 
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the 
fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a rea-
sonable time after commencing the representation. Id. 
 60. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 51, at 6 n. 2 (stating “DR 2-
106 contains substantially the same factors listed in Rule 1.5 to determine reasonableness, but does not 
require that the basis of the fee be communicated to the client ‘preferably in writing’ as Rule 1.5 does.”). 
 61. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5, supra note 59. 
 62. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 51, at 3. 
 63. Id. (citing Ethical Considerations 2-17 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility) 
(“The determination of a proper fee requires consideration of the interests of both [the] client and lawyer. A 
lawyer should not charge more than a reasonable fee, for excessive cost of legal service would deter laymen 
from utilizing the legal system in protection of their rights.”). 
 64. ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 51 (emphasis added). 
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“Continuous toil on or overstaffing of a project, for the purpose of churning 
out hours” is likewise considered an improper basis for charging fees.
65
 The ABA 
cited Model Rule 3.2,
66
 noting that “[the] job of the lawyer is to expedite the legal 
process.”
67
 The ABA concludes this way, again focusing on the time and effort 
expended by the attorney: 
It goes without saying that a lawyer who has undertaken to bill on an hour-
ly basis is never justified in charging a client for hours not actually ex-
pended. If a lawyer has agreed to charge the client on this basis and it 
turns out that the lawyer is particularly efficient in accomplishing a given 
result, it nonetheless will not be permissible to charge the client for more 
hours than were actually expended on the matter. When that basis for bill-
ing the client has been agreed to, the economies associated with the result 
must inure to the benefit of the client, not give rise to an opportunity to bill 
[a] client phantom hours.
68
 
But is this an entirely logical outcome? Respecting the airplane travel scenar-
io described in Formal Opinion 93-379, another commentator has observed that 
each client has a different set of expectations and bargains with the respective tasks 
in mind.
69
 One client’s expectation is for the attorney to travel to a deposition, 
while the other client’s “bargain” is for the attorney to spend her time preparing the 
motion. Assuming the motion is of acceptable quality and there was no prior 
agreement with the other client not to charge for travel time, a credible argument 
can be made that each client has received independent economic value—one client 
has received value in the attorney’s travel to the deposition, the other for written 
work product.
70
 It is, of course, desirable from the first client’s perspective that the 
attorney prepare for the deposition during the flight thereby maximizing the utility 
of the time spent on the airplane—time for which the client is already paying. But 
“the fact that [the attorney] is not so efficient, however, does not render her conduct 
unethical.”
71
 As the ABA recognized, as long as the attorney’s conduct is disclosed, 
there is no ethical limitation or constraint of professional responsibility that would 
preclude the attorney from suggesting to the client “additional compensation” for 
“particularly efficient or outstanding” work.
72
 
IV. THE BILLABLE HOUR IN THE CONTEXT OF RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEGAL MARKET 
                                                          
 65. Id. 
 66. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.  .2 (198 ) (“A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts 
to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”). 
 67. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 51. 
 68. Id. (emphasis added). 
 69. Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities of Law Firm Associates, 45 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 199, 231 (2007). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 51.  
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As a method for compensating lawyers for “services rendered,” the billable 
hour is an object of growing criticism, even attack.
73
 Yet for large segments of the 
legal market, despite growing competitive pressures on attorneys, the billable hour 
remains the predominant method in which attorney fees are calculated.
74
 It remains 
a lucrative method as well—a recent authoritative compensation survey of partners 
and major U.S. law firms showed that the billable hour rates of partners surveyed 




A. The Loss of Attorney Jobs Due to a Weak Global Economy 
Yet as the billable hour remains central to the economics of the delivery of 
legal services, tens of thousands of law firm jobs have been lost since at least the 
beginning of the Great Recession in late 2008, with more junior and entry-level 
attorneys bearing the biggest brunt of these increased pressures.
76
 The loss of these 
attorney jobs has impacted all segments of the bar, including some of America’s 
most elite law firms,
77
 as exemplified by the bankruptcy in 2012 of Dewey & 
LeBoeuf LLP.
78
 This firm had roots over a century old and at its peak employed 
1,400 lawyers in twenty-six offices across the globe.
79
 Dewey’s bankruptcy was 
preceded by other notorious collapses of major global law firms, notably San Fran-




Even before the financial meltdown and subsequent layoffs, between the peri-
od of March 2004 and March 2008, U.S. law firms had already shed close to 
                                                          
 73. See Harper, Billable Hour Endures, supra note 17; Evan R. Chesler, Kill the Billable Hour, 
FORBES (Dec. 25, 2008), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0112/026.html; Katherine L. Brown & Kris-
tin A. Mendoza, Ending the Tyranny of the Billable Hour: A Mandate for Change for the 21st Century Law 
Firm, 51 N.H. BAR JOURNAL 66 (2010), http://www.nhbar.org/uploads/pdf/BJ-Summer2010-Vol51-No1-
Pg66.pdf. 
 74. Robert Hirshon, The Billable Hour Is Dead. Long Live…?, 30 GPSOLO 1 (2013), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2013/january_february/billable_hour_dead_long_live.ht
ml. 
 75. Jeffrey A. Lowe, 2012 Partnership Compensation Survey, MAJOR, LINDSEY & AFRICA 1, 8 
(2012), http://www.mlaglobal.com/partner-compensation-survey/2012/FullReport.pdf. Only two of the 
twelve markets measured (Los Angeles and Philadelphia) showed declines in billing rates from 2010 to 
2012, and those declines were imperceptibly small (Los Angeles going from an average billing rate of $587 
per hour in 2010 to $584 in 2012 and Philadelphia declining $5 per hour from $516 to $511). Id. at 68. All 
the other markets for which there was data reported healthy increases. Id. For example, during the applica-
ble period, New York average rates went from $700 to $760; Dallas grew from $529 to $602; and Atlanta 
jumped from $458 to $560 per hour. Id. 
 76. See David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html?pagewanted=all. 
 77. Even Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, one of the most financially-sound Wall Street law 
firms, “with a roster of blue chip clients such as General Electric and General Motors”, announced in late 
June 2013 that the firm would be “slashing the pay”—in some cases by as much as hundreds of thousands 
of dollars—”of dozens of its partners and laying off about 170 younger attorneys and support staff.” See 
Ashby Jones & Joe Palazzolo, Law-Firm Slowdown Fuels Cuts at Weil Gotshal, WALL ST. J., June 24, 
2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323683504578565383059487410.html. 
 78. See Peter Lattman, Dewey & LeBoeuf Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 
28, 2012, 10:21 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/dewey-leboeuf-files-for-bankruptcy/. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. See also Scheiber, supra note 26. 
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20,000 high-paying attorney positions.
81
 Some of the high-profile layoffs and bank-
ruptcies were widely reported, but there were also “stealth layoff[s],” in which law-
yers—who the firm could not supply with enough work—were asked to leave for 
“performance issues,” where the attorneys were not being fully utilized.
82
 
Not unexpectedly, a sense of gloom has begun to settle on the profession, 
with notable books predicting a burst of the “lawyer bubble”
83
 and describing over-
all declining prospects for lawyers.
84
 Their authors are not merely modern-day Cas-
sandras. Their voices are backed by hard data, like a prediction from the U.S. Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics, for example, that between 2010 and 2020 the legal industry 
will add a mere 21,800 jobs each year for the 44,000 students who graduate law 
school annually.
85
 It is no wonder that law schools saw a 13.4 percent decline in 
applications for the 2013-2014 school year.
86
 
B. Increased Competitive Pressures, Including the Deregulation of the Legal 
Market 
These unprecedented stresses, felt most acutely by large law firms, emanate 
not only from a weak economy, but also from greater sophistication of clients and 
increased global competition. The stresses due to the sophistication of clients relate 
to the ascendance of in-house corporate counsels, whose primary focus is often to 
wring out as much cost from external legal expenditures as possible.
87
 Increased 
                                                          
 81. William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, Law Job Stagnation May Have Started Be-
fore the Recession–And It May Be a Sign of Lasting Change, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2011) 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/paradigm_shift/. 
 82. Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy Reichman, So, You Want to Be a Lawyer? The Quest for Profes-
sional Status in a Changing Legal World, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2289, 2298 (2010). 
 83. See generally Steven J. Harper, The Lawyer Bubble: A Profession in Crisis (2013). 
 84. See generally Michael H. Trotter, Declining Prospects: How Extraordinary Competition and 
Compensation are Changing America’s Major Law Firms (2012). 
 85. Chris Fletcher, A Message to Aspiring Lawyers: Caveat Emptor, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323320404578213223967518096.html (citing BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2012-2013 Edition available 
at http://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/lawyers.htm#tab-6); see also Scheiber, supra note 26 (“Five years ago, 
during a recession, American law schools produced 43,600 graduates and 75 percent had positions as law-
yers within nine months. Last year, the numbers were 46,500 and 64 percent. In addition to the emotional 
toll unemployment exacts, it is often financially ruinous. The average law student graduates $100,000 in 
debt.”). 
 86. Catherine Ho, Law school applications continue to slide, WASH. POST, June 2, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/law-school-applications-continue-to-sli 
de/2013/06/02/db4929b0-c93f-11e2-9245-77 c012 c027_story.html (“Last fall, George Washington Uni-
versity Law School cut its number of first-year law students from 474 to 398, the smallest in a decade and 
the second year in a row the school reduced its class size.”). 
 87. See Sue Reisinger, AIG Overhauls Global Legal Operations, CORPORATE COUNSEL 
(October 7, 2013), 
http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202622241239&AIG_Overhauls_Global_Le
gal_Operations. 
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global competition stresses include broader trends towards deregulation of the mar-
ket for legal services.
88
 
Many countries have addressed these stresses by taking steps toward deregu-
lation. 
89
 The United Kingdom, for example, has led the way with the creation of 
so-called Alternative Business Structures (“ABS”), which allow for non-lawyers to 
partner with lawyers in the ownership and operation of law firms.
90
 Some critics 
have observed that ABS firms will allow companies like Wal-Mart, Costco (on the 
pure retail side), MetLife, or CitiBank (on the financial services/insurance side) to 
set up retail law firms. Critics have argued that these arrangements would pose eth-
ical problems if non-attorney investors attempt to interfere with the independence 
and judgment of an attorney or otherwise influence the lawyer–client relationship.
91
 
As a consequence of the deregulation of the legal services market in the United 
Kingdom, one national law firm, Irwin Mitchell LLP, hired an investment bank and 
announced it was considering raising external capital through the sale of its shares 
to the public.
92
 Irwin Mitchell LLP would have been the first law firm in the United 
Kingdom to raise external capital this way, but it later elected to put off that deci-
sion for an indefinite period.
93
 
Trends towards deregulation also exist in the United States.
94
 In May 2011, 
the personal injury firm Jacoby & Meyers LLC filed lawsuits challenging state 
laws in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut that prohibited non-attorney own-
ership of law firms.
95
 Contesting what it characterized as the out-dated “prohibition 
on non-[attorney] investment in law firms,” the complaint averred that such re-
strictions precluded Jacoby & Meyers’s ability to raise the capital necessary to pay 
for improvements in technology and infrastructure, to expand its offices, and to hire 
                                                          
 88. Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 804 (2010). For a repre-
sentative application of the dynamics around the greater roles of in-house counsels, see the “Value Chal-
lenge” of the Association of Corporate Counsel (ACC), the largest bar association of in-house lawyers in 
the world. About-Association of Corporate Counsel, ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, 
http://www.acc.com/valuechallenge/about/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). The ACC describes the Value 
Challenge on its website as “an initiative to reconnect the value and the cost of legal services . . . based on 
the concept that law departments can use management practices that enhance the value of legal service 
spending; and that law firms can reduce their costs to corporate clients and still maintain strong profitabil-
ity.” Id. In terms of the execution of the Value Challenge, the ACC provides a range of information about 
specific law firm billing practices and a community forum for in-house counsels to share information about 
law firm billing rates, thereby increasing transparency and information in the marketplace. Id.  
 89. Id. 
 90. The Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, (U.K.) available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/pdfs/ukpga_20070029_en.pdf. 
 91. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2010). See generally Sara Kellogg, The 
Transformation of Legal Education, WASH. LAWYER (May 2011), 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/washington_lawyer/may_2011/legal_education.cf
m. 
 92. See Sam Chadderton, Irwin Mitchell puts flotation plans on a backburner, LAWYER (Feb. 
11, 2013), http://www.thelawyer.com/irwin-mitchell-puts-flotation-plans-on-a-backburner/3000783.article. 
 93. Neil Rose, Lawyers are right to be cautious about going public, GUARDIAN (May 5, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/may/05/lawyers-public-companies-rewards-hurdles; see also Chad-
derton, supra note 92.  
 94. See, e.g., Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices, 847 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012), vacated, 488 F. App’x 526 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 95. See id.  
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 The Jacoby & Meyers lawsuit highlighted the fact that more 
traditional sources of capital for law firms, such as personal contributions of part-
ners and retained earnings on fees generated and collected, are insufficient.
97
 Also, 
the lawsuit established that commercial bank loans are no longer sufficient to sup-
port a law firm in a competitive global marketplace.
98
 “[W]hile the theories sup-
porting these claims rest heavily on constitutional arguments such as First Amend-
ment (free speech and free association) and due process rationale, the broader mes-
sage is that limiting access to outside capital reduces the opportunities for attorney 
representation of clients, which in turn reduces access to justice.”
99
 In New York, 
there have been reasons for advocates of this new model to be hopeful. After the 
Federal District Court dismissed Jacoby & Meyers’s suit on standing grounds, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded the case for a determination 
of the constitutionality of New York Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4,
100
 which 
addresses non-lawyer investment in law firms. ,
101
 The Second Circuit specifically 
cites concerns about the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Dormant 
                                                          
 96. Brief & Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Jacob & Meyers Law Offices, LLP v. 
Presiding Justices, 488 F. App’x 526 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 12-1377-CV) 2012 WL 2089570 at *6. 
 97. Jacoby & Meyers, LLP, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 592. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Stuart L. Pardau, Alternative Litigation Financing: Perils and Opportunities, 12 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L.J. 65, 86 (2011) (“Each day in our courthouses we see the fallout from the economic downturn 
reflected in dockets surging with new foreclosure, eviction, family offense, consumer debt and criminal 
cases. This flood of cases carries with it the future of millions of New Yorkers . . . all seeking justice and 
often fighting for life’s most basic needs, people who have nowhere else to turn to but the courts to protect 
their fundamental rights.” (citations omitted) (quoting Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman of New York in his 
2011 State of the Judiciary Speech)). 
 100. Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices, 488 F. App’x 526, 526 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 101. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT, § 5.4 (McKinney 2013). Rule 5.4 reads as follows: 
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that: 
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer’s firm or another lawyer associated in the 
firm may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the law-
yer’s death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one or more specified persons; 
(2) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer 
may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that portion of the total compensation that fair-
ly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer; and 
(3) a lawyer or law firm may compensate a nonlawyer employee or include a non-lawyer 
employee in a retirement plan based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement. 
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership 
consist of the practice of law. 
(c) Unless authorized by law, a lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs or 
pays the lawyer to render legal service for another to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional 
judgment in rendering such legal services or to cause the lawyer to compromise the lawyer’s duty 
to maintain the confidential information of the client under Rule 1.6. 
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of an entity authorized to practice law for profit, 
if: 
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the es-
tate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during 
administration; 
(2) a nonlawyer is a member, corporate director or officer thereof or occupies a position of 
similar responsibility in any form of association other than a corporation; or 
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer. Id. 
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Commerce Clause, breathing life into the possibility of non-attorney investment in 
a law firm.
102
 Indeed, in 2012, the ABA 20/20 Commission on Legal Ethics deter-
mined that it would not consider any further changes or further revisions to the 
broad prohibitions on non-attorney ownership of law firms.
103
 
Independent of the Jacoby & Meyers case, a bill was introduced in 2011 in 
the North Carolina legislature that allowed for non-attorney ownership of profes-
sional law corporations.
104
 While the District of Columbia is a notable exception,
105
 
the ABA Model Rules, which sets the standard for the vast majority of jurisdic-
tions, contains a blanket prohibition on non-attorney investment in a law firm.
106
 
In addition to increased global competition, the push for deregulation is also 
seen by some commentators as being driven by disruptions emanating from rapid 
changes in technology,
107
 particularly the proliferation and wider dissemination of 
legal information and products. These products include contract forms,
108
 automat-
ed advice created on software applications,
109




C. While the Licensure System Is Unlikely to be Modified, It Is Coming Under 
Greater Scrutiny 
Another area where scholars have called for the deregulation of the U.S. legal 
market is the licensure system. In order to become an attorney, a person must ob-
tain a license, typically from a state supreme court, which, in the vast majority of 
states, requires a Juris Doctor graduate degree from an ABA accredited law 
                                                          
 102. Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices, 488 F. App’x 526, 527 (2d Cir. 201 ); see also 
David Glovin & Don Jeffrey, Jacoby & Meyers Wins Round in Nonlawyer-Investor Dispute, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 9, 2013, 1:38 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-09/jacoby-meyers-wins-round-in-
nonlawyer-investor-dispute.html. 
 103. James Podgers, Nonlawyer Ownership Interests in Law Firms Remains an Unsettled Issue 
for Ethics 20/20 Commission, ABA J. (Feb. 3, 2012, 7:21 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/nonlawyer_ownership_interests_in_law_firms_remains_an_unsettl
ed_issue/. 
 104. S.B. 254, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011). 
 105. Rule 5.4(b) of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct states in relevant part: “A lawyer may 
practice law in a partnership or other form of organization in which a financial interest is held or managerial 
authority is exercised by an individual nonlawyer who performs professional services which assist the 
organization in providing legal services to client, but only if: (1) The partnership or organization has as its 
sole purpose providing legal services to clients; [and] (2) All persons having such managerial authority or 
holding a financial interest undertake to abide by these rules of Professional Conduct.” D.C. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2013). 
 106. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2011). 
 107. Sharon Driscoll, A Positive Disruption: The Transformation of Law Through Technology, 
STAN. LAW. (June 4, 2013), http://stanfordlawyer.law.stanford.edu/2013/06/a-positive-disruption/. 
 108. An example of a firm that offers these alternative legal services is LegalZoom.com, an 
online company that sells simple, “do-it-yourself,” legal documents. LegalZoom.com was the subject of a 
class action lawsuit filed in Missouri, alleging the unauthorized practice of law, although the case settled 
before going to trial. Mike Holter, LegalZoom Reaches Class Action Lawsuit Settlement, TOP CLASS 
ACTIONS (Sept. 16, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://www.topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-
news/1371-legalzoom-reaches-class-action-lawsuit-settlement. 
 109. See, e.g., LEGAL ADVICE.COM, http://www.legaladvice.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). 
 110. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1169, 1198–99 (2011). 
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 and successful passage of the state’s bar examination.
112
 The ABA has 
long played a central role in setting licensure standards. Beginning in the early 
1920s, the ABA first attempted to include accreditation of law schools as part of 
the state’s occupational licensing, adopting a set of minimum standards required of 
law schools and publishing a list of those institutions that complied with those 
standards.
113
 It took time, however, for state legislatures to adopt or to be signifi-
cantly influenced by these standards; for years following the ABA’s first publica-
tion of the educational standards, not one state made graduation from an ABA-
accredited law school a requirement for admission to its state bar.
114
 By the 1950’s, 
however, approximately half of the states required a person to graduate from an 
ABA-accredited law school in order to be admitted to the state’s bar.
115
 
Scholars argue that state bars and the ABA place unnecessary roadblocks and 
constraints on competition in the legal industry, thereby reducing the quality and 
choices of legal services and increasing the cost to consumers.
116
 Specifically, these 
scholars contend that the licensure regimes imposed by the various state bars artifi-
cially restrict the supply of lawyers, enabling lawyers to extract an “earnings pre-
mium.”
117
 The hourly billable rates lawyers are able to charge as a result of this 
system of licensure reflect this “premium,” and otherwise distort market rates.
118
 
                                                          
 111. Alabama, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, West Virginia, and Tennessee allow indi-
viduals to take the bar exam upon graduation from law schools approved by state bodies but not accredited 
by the American Bar Association. AL. R. ADMIS. Rule II.; CAL. ST. RULES OF STATE BAR R. 4.26; CT. ST. § 
51-81; MA. ST. 221 § 37; TN. R. S. CT. Rule 8, R.P.C. 8.1; W.V. ST. § 30-2-1. In California, for example, 
certain law schools are registered with the Committee of Bar Examiners (“CBE”) of the State Bar of Cali-
fornia. Such schools are authorized to grant the J.D. law degree. Students at these schools must take and 
pass the First-Year Law Students’ Examination (commonly referred to as the “Baby Bar”) administered by 
the CBE. The Purpose and Importance of the California Baby Bar Exam, CAL. S. UNIV., 
http://www.calsouthern.edu/online-law-degrees/baby-bar-exam/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). Upon success-
ful passing of the “Baby Bar,” those students may continue with their law studies to obtain their J.D. de-
gree. CAL. ST. RULES OF STATE BAR Rule 4.26. In addition, subject to strict limitations, California, Ver-
mont, Virginia, and Washington allow an applicant who attended law school to take the bar exam after 
study under a judge or practicing attorney for an extended period of time. CAL. ST. RULES OF THE STATE 
BAR Rule 4.29; VT. R. BAR ADMIS. § 6; VA. ST. § 54.1-3926; WA. R. ADMIS. A.P.R. 5 (amended 2013). 
This method is known as “reading law” or “reading the law.” New York requires that applicants who are 
reading the law have at least one year of law school study. N.Y. R. A. CT. § 520.4 (Maine allows students 
with two years of law school to serve an apprenticeship in lieu of completing their third year. ME. ST. T. 4, 
§ 803 (2013)). 
 112. See generally Requirements for Graduation & Bar Admission, UNIV. OF WIS. L. SCH., 
http://law.wisc.edu/current/rtf/04.0.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2013) (The District of Columbia and all states 
(except Wisconsin) have as a requirement for licensure to take and successfully pass the state bar exam. 
Wisconsin allows graduates of the University of Wisconsin Law School to practice law without passing a 
bar examination, which is known as the so-called “Diploma Privilege.”). 
 113. See CLIFFORD WINSTON, ROBERT W. CRANDALL & VIKRAM MAHESHRI, THE FIRST THING 
WE DO, LET’S DEREGULATE ALL THE LAWYERS 2 (2011).  
 114. Id. at 3. 
 115. Id. (According to Milton Friedman, the only reason more states did not adopt the ABA-
accreditation requirements was that, at the time, many state legislators themselves were graduates of unac-
credited schools. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 152 (1962)). 
 116. See WINSTON, supra note 113. 
 117. Id. at 6–7. 
 118. Id. 
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V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? ALTERNATIVE FEE 
ARRANGEMENTS? 
Given the external pressures by clients to hold down legal expenses and the 
internal dissatisfaction among lawyers at firms with the mounting pressures of bill-
ing more hours, alternative fee arrangements (“AFA”) have gained in popularity.
119
 
As one observer noted, the billable hour is “a dying business model . . . because it 
focuses on selling the wrong thing. . . . [N]o client in the history of the planet has 
ever wanted to buy time. . . . [I]t’s what you can do for them during that time.”
120
 
Or as others have observed, it is not that clients object to billable hours per se, but 
rather, perhaps, that they seek greater efficiencies and desire to reduce costs.
121
 
According to the late Larry Ribstein, because the future delivery of legal services 
will largely involve what he termed “legal information products,” (the desire for 
greater efficiency and reduced costs encourages firms to use commoditized services 
or large-scale technological solutions, such as the digitization of much of the dis-
covery process) there will still be the need for “customized” legal services
122
 and 
advice, especially on complex matters.
123
 Ironically, observed Ribstein, these cus-
tomized legal services are precisely the services that are likely to be priced by the 
hour.
124
 “One promising explanation is that the hourly fee is a function of the law 
firm’s reputational capital. . . . [G]iven the risk of law firm cheating from over-
billing hours, only firms with substantial reputations can get away with charging by 
the hour. At the same time, these firms attract more complex work for which the 
number of hours required may be substantial . . . .”
125
 
But there remain practical business reasons why the billable hour, or some 
variant of it, will remain.
126
 “Time”—in this case, the billable hour, or a fraction 
thereof—is the standard measure of internal and external output for many types of 
businesses.
127
 Even most AFA’s contain within them some billable hour compo-
                                                          
 119. See Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 551–54 (2010). 
 120. Jay Shepherd, Small Firms, Big Lawyers: Blade Runner and the Future of Law, ABOVE THE 
LAW (Apr. 24, 2011, 3:39 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/04/small-firms-big-lawyers-blade-runner-
and-the-future-of-law/ (emphasis added). 
 121. Claude R. Bowles, et al., Lawyers, Law Firms & the Legal Profession: An Ethical View of 
the Business of Law, 6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 487, 494 (2008). 
 122. See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF 
LEGAL SERVICES (2008) (There are also what British scholar Richard Susskind has termed as “bespoke” 
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 For example, “blended rates are simply . . . mathematical variation[s] of 
hourly charge[s], and most fixed fee arrangements are based on a [law] firm’s esti-
mate of the number of hours . . . required to handle a client matter”; these arrange-
ments are tantamount to an a priori fixing or agreement on an hourly price.
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Lastly, some of the ethical dilemmas for lawyers in private practice presented 
by the billable hour will very likely persist, even if AFA’s become the predominant 
method for charging clients. One commentator has identified numerous factors 
which are causes of concern, and which would be present with or without the billa-
ble hour, including: 
the ever-present desire to maximize profits; the gradual realization that at-
torneys could make more money from the labor of others than they could 
from their own labor; . . . [and] the pressure[s] on managing partners to 
make firms profitable, which mean[s] that associates [have] to produce in-
come equal to roughly threes time their salary.”
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Likewise, others have observed that lawyers may “overbill” based on any 
number of motivations, including: (1) ignorance of acceptable standards of con-
duct; (2) professional insecurity; (3) the absence of a meaningful bond with the 
firm; (4) lawyers’ competitiveness; (5) compensation systems that directly reward a 
high number of hours billed; (6) an almost adversarial approach to dealings with 
clients; (7) “greed and envy”; and even (8) “mental illness . . . and substance 
abuse”.
131
 In further support of this view, one survey review of the literature also 
revealed that unethical conduct by attorneys is not a function of any particular fee 
arrangement, but rather is correlated to issues such as “marginality of practice, cli-
ent pressures, practice context . . . and the social context of a particular law firm”; 
in this regard, fee arrangements might influence the specific nature of the lawyer’s 
unethical behavior, but not the likelihood of the unethical behavior itself.
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Nevertheless, given the sense of increased competition, law firms will contin-
ue to feel obliged to consider AFA’s, if only because their clients continue to de-
mand it.
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 The litigation boutique Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP 
exclusively utilizes AFA’s, most frequently involving a “flat monthly [retainer] that 
fluctuates [based] on the stage of the litigation, [with] the most expensive fees 
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 But Bartlit Beck remains an outlier, with the vast majority of law 
firms using AFA’s in a limited capacity without fully eroding the core billable hour 
method.
135
 Thus, as one commentator put it, while AFA’s “are being increasingly 
used by more and more law firms . . . clearly the billable hour no longer rules the 





In a broad sense, we are living in a brave new world. The initial shock of the 
global financial collapse of 2008 eventually gave way to traditional American 
hopes that “this too shall pass,” that things would turn around, as they always have. 
But recovery has been modest, and as the economy has continued to languish, these 
hopes have, in some ways, been deferred. Certainly, globalization and the outsourc-
ing of activities long delegated to associates pose challenges for old ways of doing 
law firm business. In the coming years, law firms, like their clients, will evolve or 
die, and the firms best suited for survival will have no sacred cows—the billable 
hour not excepted. 
But is there really a better way? Lincoln’s observation remains true today. A 
lawyer still trades in advice and time, even if the complexities inherent in the deliv-
ery of value to the client have increased dramatically in the last century and a half. 
It is hard to imagine a world where lawyers, at least on the defense side, are not in 
some way “billing” for “hours.” But law firms, as businesses, are subject to the 
demand for increased efficiency that comes with increased scarcity of resources. At 
the future’s successful firms, the lawyer’s hour will go further, and questions about 
the impediment that traditional billable hour regimes pose for this goal are justified. 
Nevertheless, no wholesale alternative has emerged to date, and the billable hour, 
even as it has always been known, is proving resilient. 
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